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Abstract
Package managers for software repositories based on a
single programming language are very common. Examples
include npm (JavaScript), and PyPI (Python). These tools en-
courage code reuse, making it trivial for developers to import
external packages. Unfortunately, repositories’ size and the
ease with which packages can be published facilitates the
practice of typosquatting: the uploading of a package with
name similar to that of a highly popular package, typically
with the aim of capturing some of the popular package’s in-
stalls. Typosquatting has serious negative implications, result-
ing in developers importing malicious packages, or—as we
show—code clones which do not incorporate recent security
updates.
In order to tackle this problem, we present SpellBound,
a tool for identifying and reporting potentially erroneous
imports to developers. SpellBound implements a novel ty-
posquatting detection technique, based on an in-depth anal-
ysis of npm and PyPI. Our technique leverages a model of
lexical similarity between names, and further incorporates the
notion of package popularity. This approach flags cases where
unknown/scarcely used packages would be installed in place
of popular ones with similar names, before installation oc-
curs. We evaluated SpellBound on both npm and PyPI, with
encouraging results: SpellBound flags typosquatting cases
while generating limited warnings (0.5% of total package in-
stalls), and low overhead (only 2.5% of package install time).
Furthermore, SpellBound allowed us to confirm known cases
of typosquatting and discover one high-profile, unknown case
of typosquatting that resulted in a package takedown by the
npm security team.
1 Introduction
Package managers are tools which automate the complex
task of deploying 3rd-party dependencies into a codebase,
abstracting away the provenance of the dependency; when the
user invokes a command to install the package by name, the
given package will be downloaded from a remote repository,
alongside the full set of additional packages upon which it
transitively depends. One of the most common uses of pack-
age managers is in the context of large repositories of code
packages based on a single programming language. Pack-
age managers are undeniably useful, with open, free-for-all
repositories like npm for Node.js/JavaScript, PyPI for Python,
the NuGet Gallery for Microsoft’s .NET Framework, and
crates.io for Rust, collectively serving billions of packages
per week. Despite their utility, package managers also come
with problems.
The ease with which code can be imported facilitates incor-
rect imports. Installing an unintended code dependency can
be catastrophic, but happens as easily as mistyping a single
character on the command line. Furthermore, the open, uncu-
rated nature of these repositories means that any developer
can upload a package with a name of their choosing and it will
be treated with equal trust as any other package in the reposi-
tory. This circumstance gives rise to typosquatting, whereby a
developer uploads a “perpetrator” package that is confusable
with an existing “target” package due to name similarity.
The process by which typosquatting acts is simple: the user,
intending to install the target package, accidentally requests
the name of the confusable perpetrator package. Determin-
ing why perpetrators packages are created and uploaded is
a challenging and ill-defined problem, as solving it requires
inferring the intent of the package author. The perpetrator may
wish to intentionally confuse users into installing a malicious
payload, seek to increase the visibility of their own benign
code, or may have created a confusable name by happen-
stance, without realizing it. A typosquatting perpetrator might
even upload a placeholder package to prevent an attacker from
leveraging the given name. Regardless of the intent, the result
is the same: users are confused into importing the incorrect
package into their code.
Typosquatting has numerous detriments, both to developers
who integrate a perpetrator package into their codebase, and
to the end-users of such a codebase. An overtly malicious
perpetrator may include Trojan functionality that attacks the
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client when run [10, 12]. Additionally, many package man-
agers invoke configuration hooks bundled with the package
at install time, often manifested as shell scripts that run with
the privileges of the user. Multiple packages that open reverse
shells when installed have been removed from npm [9,11,13].
Even in cases where the perpetrator package is not overtly
malicious, it can confuse the user and weaken the integrity
of the system. Ironically, a perpetrator might clone a victim
to keep it out of the hands of an attacker but allow the clone
to fall behind as the target is updated, exposing users of the
clone to latent vulnerabilities that have been patched out of
the target.
Typosquatting is a difficult problem to detect manually, as it
confuses manual inspection by definition. In this work, we de-
velop SpellBound, a novel typosquatting detection technique
to discover and prevent incidents of typosquatting before they
can damage the user. SpellBound can be used to detect ty-
posquatting incidents before they happen, or to detect possible
perpetrator packages within a package repository.
To illustrate typosquatting, and the benefits of our approach,
consider the example of loadsh, an npm package that Spell-
Bound reported to be typosquatting the popular lodash pack-
age. Because loadsh is a transposition of the “a” and “d”
characters of lodash, our techniques detected that the pack-
age names are easily confusable. We confirmed that loadsh
was being used uninentitionally by emailing the maintain-
ers of packages that used loadsh. Three loadsh-dependant
package maintainers responded to our email, all of whom
acknowledged that they had intended to install lodash and
indicated that they would change their dependency. Many of
the packages using loadsh, including those maintained by our
respondents, had been victims for over a year.
The loadsh incident exemplifies several stealthy aspects of
package name typosquatting; not only are the developers who
use loadsh victims of a typosquatting attack, so are packages
that transitively depends on loadsh (i.e. those codebases that
depend on a package that accidentally uses loadsh). Thus,
it is possible to be a victim to a typosquatting attack with-
out personally making a typo. Another difficulty in detecting
packages like loadsh is that they may not exhibit malicious
behavior. Indeed, loadsh does not include any malicious func-
tionality - the perpetrator package is an exact snapshot copy
of lodash version 4.17.11, the current version of the target at
the time at which the typosquatting package was created (the
target package lodash is currently at version 4.17.15). Nev-
ertheless, the perpetrator still has a negative impact; because
the perpetrator package has not been updated, its victims
were effectively using an outdated version of lodash. In the
case of this example, the older version has been reported to
contain prototype pollution vulnerabilities [15], effectively
leaving victims of loadsh open to attacks that have already
been patched in the current version of lodash. When loadsh
was reported, 63 other package depended on it. Each of these
dependents were, by extension, vulnerable to prototype pol-
lution. After SpellBound reported loadsh as a typosquatting
perpetrator, we contacted the npm security team, who verified
our results, deprecated loadsh, and took over ownership of
the package.
As indicated by the loadsh example above SpellBound can
be used to detect if a given package is a perpetrator of a ty-
posquatting attack. At high level, SpellBound intercepts and
analyzes package install requests. First, it checks if a given
package is not popular. If so, it checks if the given package’s
name is lexically similar to that of a popular one (we describe
and motivate our notions of popularity and similarity in Sec-
tion 3). If both conditions are met, SpellBound concludes that
the user is at risk of installing a typosquatting perpetrator, and
issues an alert before the package is fetched. Furthermore, it
presents a suggestion for the likely correct package name that
is being typosquatted.
Overall, our work makes the following contributions:
• We highlight the security implications of typosquatting.
• We study the extent to which typosquatting exists in npm
and PyPI.
• We present SpellBound, an enhancement to the pack-
age manager front-end which protects users against ty-
posquatting attacks.
• We evaluate the efficacy of SpellBound. We show it of-
fers a higher level of security while incurring a 2.5%
overhead during package installation. Additionally, we
demonstrate that SpellBound is non-intrusive, as it af-
fects less than 1% of all weekly downloads for popular
package repositories.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
provides background on package managers and typosquat-
ting attacks. Section 3 describes and motivates the design of
SpellBound. Section 4 evaluates SpellBound’s performance.
Section 5 discusses limitations and possible extensions of our
work. Section 6 examines the related work. Finally, Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Background
In this section, we give background information necessary to
understand the need for a tool like SpellBound. In particular,
we show how the current landscape of package management
enables typosquatting, and describe previous attacks that use
typosquatting to deliver malicious payloads. We discuss the
context that makes typosquatting a pernicious problem for
many of the repository stakeholders, including end-users of
applications, application developers, package providers, and
the maintainers of repositories themselves.
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npm PyPI
Packages 1,221,705 221,041
Weekly Downloads 17,872,179,641 997,624,343
Avg. Dependency Tree Size 57.27 4.58
Table 1: Usage statistics for npm and PyPI: Both repositories
serve significant numbers of highly interdependent packages
on a weekly basis.
2.1 Package Repositories
The use of package repositories for managing dependencies is
incredibly popular. They simplify the use of third-party code,
which in turn has obvious benefits. It encourages code reuse;
it allows expertly-written and well-vetted codebases to be
deployed by more developers; and it leverages the knowledge
of the broader software development community even for
highly-custom projects. For these reasons, successful repos-
itories may grow to enormous size. The first two rows of
Table 1 show the current size and weekly download counts for
npm and PyPI, as reported by the repository maintainers. As
the table shows, they contain hundreds of thousands (in the
case of PyPI), or even millions (in the case of npm) of publicly
available packages. The total number of weekly downloads
served are nearly 1 billion in the case of PyPI and over 17
billion in the case of npm.
Much of the complexity of package management is due to
the interdependence of packages. For example, the popular
npm package webpack-dev-server (6.6 million weekly down-
loads) declares 33 dependencies of its own. These 33 depen-
dencies require further packages to be installed (the transitive
dependencies of webpack-dev-server). In total, webpack-dev-
server has 391 transitive dependencies. Running webpack-
dev-server requires that all 391 packages are installed. Fur-
thermore, these packages span many distinct development
teams, each of which may update out of step with one another,
introducing new functionality and behavior. This is in line
with the general trend of code reuse in software development:
a recent report by the software security company Contrast
Security found that 79% of application code came from third
parties [34]. Given the bulk of code existing in dependencies,
it is infeasible to expect developers to manually vet every
package or piece of code that they integrate into their project.
Package manager frontends automate the complex and te-
dious task of fetching, configuring, and updating a package
and its transitive dependencies. When a user issues a com-
mand like npm install webpack-dev-server, the fron-
tend relies on the package’s metadata to build a spanning
tree of the package dependency graph (referred to internally
as the package dependency tree), and then installs each pack-
age node in the tree. Similarly, the command npm update
updates the package dependency tree for the current set of
packages, and ensures that the most recent compatible ver-
sions of dependencies are deployed. The third row of Table 1
shows the average size of the dependency tree for the two
package managers we study. It is notable that there is signifi-
cant interdependence among packages.
While package managers save users a significant amount
of time, they do not help with the herculean task of vetting
imported code; if anything, they complicate it. The key design
goal of package manager frontends is that they make fulfilling
dependencies opaque to the user. As a result, the provenance
of a package is also obscured - a user need not explicitly trust
the developer of a package they (transitively) use, nor even
know who uploaded the code to the package repository. Once
a package is registered to the repository, it is given equal trust
as any other package on the repository, and may be freely
integrated into applications or other packages.
Characterization of Package Downloads: The majority of
package downloads are due to a small number of packages.
Based on the self-reported repository download counts, we
classified the popularity of packages across npm and PyPI.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the distribution of downloads
across npm and PyPI, respectively. A majority of the pack-
ages for both repositories are downloaded between zero and
ten times per week. Only a small fraction of packages see a
high degree of popularity. However, the packages compos-
ing the smallest portion of each figure actually receive more
downloads than the packages in all remaining portions com-
bined. Locating desired packages in this ocean of unpopular
ones without assistance can be challenging.
2.2 Factors Contributing to Typosquatting
The automated nature of package managers has enormous util-
ity. However, this also enables misuse, namely typosquatting.
We propose that the following aspects of package repositories
contribute to the threat of typosquatting:
• The open-source nature of repositories means that any
user can upload a package, and it will be given equal
trust with any other package.
• The provenance of a package is opaque to the user, and
the interdependence between packages makes their be-
havior difficult to vet manually.
• The distribution of packages means there are a small
number of “juicy” typosquatting targets, and a large num-
ber of package from which a typosquatting attack could
be launched.
We now review select cases of historical typosquatting, and
describe the challenges in detecting typosquatting reliably.
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Figure 1: Download distribution for packages on npm.
2.3 Historical Package Typosquatting
The degree to which typosquatting has historically occurred
is difficult to capture, due in part to the highly subjective
nature of what constitutes typosquatting. Indeed, there exist
cases of package name similarity where intent may appear
benign or ambiguous. In practice, most packages that are
flagged by repositories exhibit overtly malicious functionality,
and are retroactively deemed typosquatting perpetrators by
a qualitative manual analysis. It is also important to observe
that not all malicious packages perform typosquatting.
As an example of the complexities of determining ty-
posquatting and its intent, consider the js-sha3 typosquatting
campaign. On October 25th, 2019, 25 packages were simulta-
neously identified by Microsoft Vulnerability Research and
taken down by the npm security team: zs-sha3, ns-sha3,
ks-sha3, jw-sha3, jsmsha3, js-wha3, js-sxa3, js-sla3, js-sja3,
js-sia3, js-shq3, js-she3, js-shc3, js-shas, js-sha7, js-rha3, js-
qha3, js-cha3, js-3ha3, jr-sha3, jq-sha3, jc-sha3, j3-sha3, hs-
sha3, bs-sha3.
Upon close inspection, all those packages were determined
to have malicious intent, and all package names were close,
according to Levenshtein distance, to the victim package js-
sha3. However, not all packages names were likely to confuse
the user. For example, js-sxa3 requires replacing the “h” with
an “x”. It is unlikely that a developer would misremember
js-sha3 as js-sxa3 (the package being an implementation of
the SHA-3 algorithm). A typo is equally unlikely on a QW-
ERTY keyboard, given the distance between “h” and “x”. As
discussed in Section 3.3, we take the stance of only flagging
cases where there is strong likelihood that name similarity
may confuse the user. While this causes us to ignore some
cases (as js-sxa3 above), it has the advantage to avoid gener-
ating an excessive number of warnings.
One may also be tempted to solve these ambiguities by
always attempting to identify malicious intent, regardless of
whether typosquatting occurs. In practice, this is challenging
and currently impossible to achieve reliably. Source code anal-
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Figure 2: Download distribution for packages on PyPI.
yses might be employed to catch overtly malicious behavior in
a perpetrator package, but they have difficulty detecting obfus-
cated payloads. JavaScript is a particularly difficult target to
analyze - recent work has shown that JavaScript can be auto-
matically obfuscated to appear syntactically indistinguishable
from benign code to modern detectors [25]. Furthermore, the
highly dynamic nature of JavaScript means that malicious
functionality may not appear until the script is deployed.
Currently, the standard technique for removing these pack-
ages is manual and reactive. Users who believe a package is
performing malicious typosquatting can file a report to the
repository maintainers, who will then investigate the claim.
Should the maintainers agree with the reporter, the package
will be removed. This approach does little to prevent the in-
stallation of malicious packages and fails to protect users
from the consequences.
Despite the shortcomings of this approach, hundreds of
package takedowns have been issued that involve package
names similar to a popular target. We believe this number to be
a lower bound on the total number of typosquatting attempts.
Due to the ease with which packages can be registered to a
repository, the differential of effort favors the attacker; the
25 packages reported by Microsoft above exhibit many of
the hallmarks of automatic creation (which may contribute
to the poor confusability of some of the entries), such as
identical payloads. Thus, an attacker can outpace the current
manual detection techniques through clever scripting. Many
of the reported incidents of typosquatting with a malicious
payload were active for months or even years before they
were reported.
2.4 Consequences of Typosquatting
A package repository ecosystem consists of several distinct
stakeholders, many of whom are adversely affected by ty-
posquatting. We note some of the ways in which the con-
sequences of confusing a perpetrator package for a victim
package can be felt by these parties:
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Attacks against end-users: The most subtle attack that uses
typosquatting is when an adversarial uploader delivers a ma-
licious payload as part of the dependency code, which is
subsequently used as part of a user-facing application. This
attack impacts the end-user of the application. Two highly-
publicized incidents of this consequence involved a malicious
payload that exfiltrated sensitive information such as credit
card numbers [12] or cryptocurrency [13]. A stealthy adver-
sary may attempt to obscure the payload by cloning the target
package and adding the malicious functionality as a Trojan.
Attacks against developers using a package: An adversary
may also target the developer who mistakenly requests the
perpetrator package at install time. Both npm and PyPI allow
packages to invoke shell scripts in order to configure and de-
ploy the script, which run under the privileges of the invoking
user. Since packages can be installed system-wide, the user
may be the administrator, opening a vector for an adversary to
do catastrophic harm to the developer’s machine. A common
choice for malicious package creators is to open a reverse
shell, giving them full control of the victim’s machine [14].
Degradation of functionality: Even when perpetrator does
not deploy malicious code, they may still hinder operations.
If the confusion is purely accidental, it is likely to be noticed
well before the victim application is deployed. Nevertheless,
this incidental confusion will at least waste time, the victim’s
time, in diagnosing the problem.
Latent vulnerabilities: If a perpetrator package is not de-
tected immediately upon installation, it may remain latent
in the victim’s codebase for a significant period of time. A
frequent cause of this is when a developer typosquats a tar-
get with a payload that is a clone of the current version of
the package. While the victim experiences no initial conse-
quences from using the wrong package, they are at the mercy
of the perpetrator that the code will be kept in lockstep with
the target. As in the case of loadsh, mentioned in Section 1,
the clone may never be updated, meaning that the perpetrator
is exposed to latent bugs and vulnerabilities that have been
patched in the target [15].
Misattribution: Even if a perpetrator package replicates all
of the target functionality, it nevertheless fragments the pop-
ularity of the target package. Thus, one minor consequence
of typosquatting is that the target will not get as much credit
as they would without the perpetrator. Misattribution can be
found in packages like asimplemde on npm. In addition to
typosquatting, this package contains identical functionality to
simplemde. References attributing credit to the original author
are the sole omissions from the duplicate package.
3 Detecting Typosquatting
Motivated by the number of historical instances, the ease of
execution, and the severity of the possible consequences, we
created SpellBound, a tool to detect typosquatting in package
repositories. At a high level, SpellBound compares a given
package name to a list of popular package names. If the given
package name matches at least one of the popular packages
after a set of allowed transformations (or signals), then it is
considered to be a typosquatting suspect. In that case, Spell-
Bound raises a alert and indicates the likely package being
typosquatted before prompting the user to proceed.
3.1 SpellBound Workflow
The primary way in which we expect SpellBound to be de-
ployed is as a user-facing utility that integrates with the pack-
age manager frontend and introspects upon packages before
they are installed.
Figure 4 depicts the overall workflow of SpellBound, in-
cluding both typosquatting detection and steps performed
in the normal course of package installation. Algorithm 1
presents a description of typosquatting detection (steps 4
through 7 in the figure) in pseudocode.
The user initiates the process by triggering a package’s
installation from the command line, e.g., npm install
loadsh (step 1). The package manager computes the de-
pendency tree of the package, i.e. its transitive closure on the
package graph (step 2). Subsequently, it discards all pack-
ages that are already installed, and thus do not need to be
downloaded (step 3). At this point, the workflow triggers
SpellBound’s logic.
First, SpellBound considers each package queued to be
installed (steps 4-5, lines 1-3 in Algorithm 1). A package is
considered suspicious if its popularity score (explained in
Section 3.4) is below a tunable threshold Tp, and there ex-
ists a popular (popularity ≥ Tp) package with a similar name
(similarity is discussed in Section 3.3). If this is the case,
SpellBound flags the package and prompts the user (step 5-6,
lines 4-8). The prompt displays a brief explanation of the
warning, which includes both the name of the offending pack-
age, and the name of the package that most likely should be
installed instead (an example prompt is shown in Figure 3). If
the user decides to ignore the warning, the package is installed
(step 8, line 6), otherwise the process is terminated. Note that
AbortInstallation() in line 8 terminates the process for all
queued packages, not just the one which was the object of
the warning. In lines 9-10, any package which does not raise
suspicion is directly installed without prompting the user.
3.2 SpellBound Batch Analysis
While we anticipate the workflow in Figure 4 to be the most
common application of SpellBound, we also envision repos-
itory maintainers may want to periodically apply the same
analysis in batch fashion to the entire package repository.
This would simplify the task of identifying highly suspicious
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Figure 3: Package installation prompt
packages. Our current implementation also supports this ap-
proach. In this mode, SpellBound receives as input the list of
all package names. It then returns a list of candidate perpetra-
tors, ranked by decreasing download count. Indeed, the loadsh
package discussed in Section 1 was identified in this way;
SpellBound’s batch analysis ranked it as the seventh most
popular typosquatting candidate matching a specific signal
discussed in the next subsection.
3.3 Typosquatting Signals
SpellBound relies on the ability to identify pairs of packages
with similar names; however, precisely defining the notion
of similarity is challenging. Initially we experimented with
thresholds on basic Levenshtein distance. However, we found
this approach overly simplistic, and generating an enormous
number of matches. These similarities are bound to happen
purely due to the size of the repository: there are 9,371 3-
letter packages in npm, and only 17,576 combinations of
three lowercase English letters1.
After extensively exploring alternative approaches, we de-
signed a notion of similarity that relies on the disjunction of
six possible signals (i.e., triggering one signal causes a pair
of names to be considered similar). These signals were cre-
ated by examining past typosquatting attacks and extending
signals used to detect domain name typosquatting such that
they apply to package repositories [29,40]. The signals, along
with descriptions and examples of genuine perpetrator/victim
package pairs are listed below. Note that a majority of the
examples used are historical typosquatting instances and have
been removed, though all examples would be detected by
SpellBound.
1. Repeated characters — the presence of consecutive du-
plicates in a package name. For example, reequest is
typosquatting request.
2. Omitted characters — a restricted form of edit distance,
not allowing arbitrary character substitutions and addi-
tions. The maximum allowed number of omissions is
set to one. For example, comander is typosquatting com-
mander and require-port is typosquatting requires-port.
3. Swapped characters — two consecutive characters have
been swapped. For example, axois is typosquatting axios.
1Names can use other symbols, however most short names do not include
them.
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Figure 4: Modified package installation process with inte-
grated typosquatting protection.
4. Swapped words — this signal depends on the presence
of delimiters in a package name, where a delimiter is
a period, hyphen, or underscore. This signal checks for
any other ordering of delimiter-separated tokens in the
package repository namespace. This signal checks for
reordering with other delimiters as well. For example,
import-mysql is typosquatting mysql-import.
5. Common typos — character substitutions based on phys-
ical locality on the QWERTY keyboard layout. This
signal also checks for substitutions of characters with
visual similarity. For example, signqle is typosquatting
signale, 1odash (with the number one) is typosquatting
lodash (with the letter L), and uglify.js is typosquatting
uglify-js. The rationale for checking for characters with
visual similarity is that, even if users are unlikely to make
the typo, they may overlook such packages if they are
imported indirectly as malicious dependencies. These
packages are not explicitly requested by the user, how-
ever, they can be seen during the installation process.
Attackers could utilize this style of substitution in hopes
that it could be confused with another at a glance.
6. Version numbers — the presence of integers located at
the end of package names. Optional delimiters between
the package name and the version number are also con-
sidered. For example, underscore.string-2 is typosquat-
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ting underscore.string. Note that underscore.string-2
was previously undiscovered and SpellBound led us to
find a latent vulnerability.
3.4 Package Popularity
Once the typosquatting detection scheme had been created,
we required some formal definition of popularity to success-
fully implement SpellBound. This requirements stems from a
fundamental belief that we posit, which is that only unpopular
packages can be typosquatting perpetrators and only popu-
lar packages can be typosquatting targets. Popular packages
are, by our definition, incapable of perpetrating typosquat-
ting attacks. Next, we believe that there exists no incentive
for an adversary to typosquat a package which receives an
insignificant amount of attention. If a negligible number of
users download that package, then an even smaller number of
people could potentially misspell the name of that package
and fall victim to the attack. By this token, a package which
is downloaded thousands, millions, or even tens of millions
of times per week, is a far more rewarding target.
The two main possibilities for quantifying package pop-
ularity were the number of downloads and the number of
dependents. We decided to focus on the number of downloads
because we believe it is a more indicative measure of true
package usage. The public number of dependents counts only
the number of other packages that have been uploaded to the
repository that directly depend on a given package. Download
count, on the other hand, counts the number of users who have
downloaded that package either directly or indirectly through
some arbitrarily long chain of dependencies.
Popularity based on download count requires the definition
of a threshold to distinguish between popular and unpopular
packages. This threshold is of crucial importance because the
number of packages considered to be typosquatting depends
directly on the number of packages considered to be popular.
An exceedingly low threshold results in many typosquatting
packages being considered popular, thus making their detec-
tion impossible. Conversely, an exceedingly high threshold
may miss packages with are frequently downloaded and are
victims of typosquatting. We use a data-driven approach, dis-
cussed in Section 4, to determine the threshold.
4 Analysis and Evaluation
In this section, we perform an in-depth analysis of Spell-
Bound’s tunable parameter, the popularity threshold, and we
evaluate SpellBound’s effectiveness in flagging suspicious
package installs. Our goal is to answer the following ques-
tions:
1. Is it possible to determine an optimal popularity thresh-
old based on repository characteristics? What is the im-
pact of varying this threshold? (Section 4.2).
Algorithm 1 SpellBound typosquatting detection
Input: List I of packages to be installed
Input: Package graph G
Input: Popularity threshold TP
1: for each p ∈ I do
2: if Popularity(p) < TP then
3: if ∃p′ s.t. Popularity(p′) ≥ TP and Similar(p, p′)
then
4: R← UserConfirm?(p, p′);
5: if R= True then
6: Install(p);
7: else
8: AbortInstallation();
9: else
10: Install(p);
2. What is the effectiveness of SpellBound’s typosquat-
ting signals in identifying suspicious packages? (Sec-
tion 4.3).
3. Is the latency introduced by SpellBound to the package
installation process acceptable? (Section 4.3).
4.1 Dataset
In order to perform our analysis, we consider the entire pack-
age graphs for npm and PyPI. In particular, our analysis is
based on snapshots of npm and PyPI which reflect their state
on February 19, 2020. A high-level quantitative summary of
both repository snapshots is given in Table 1.
4.2 Popularity Threshold
Download counts bear an obvious relationship to the popu-
larity of a given package within the developer community.
Precisely understanding this relationship however requires
careful analysis of a software ecosystem. This is due to the
fact that download counts on npm and PyPI represent more
than the number of people who have installed a package. Pack-
ages are regularly downloaded by repository mirrors and bots
which download all packages for analysis. These downloads
are also recorded in a package’s total download count. Based
on estimates made by the creators of npm, a package can
be downloaded up to 50 times per day without ever being
installed by an actual developer [2].
Based on this estimate, we use 350 weekly downloads as
an absolute lower bound for package popularity as packages
with fewer than this number of downloads may have never
been downloaded by an actual user. As seen in Figures 1 and
2, a majority of packages in both npm and PyPI receive fewer
than 350 weekly downloads. The stipulation that a package
must have, at the very minimum, 350 weekly downloads to be
considered popular removes about 93.9% of npm packages
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Figure 5: Relationship between popularity threshold and per-
cent of repository typosquatting.
and about 93.3% of PyPI packages from consideration. Inter-
estingly, this suggest that only a tiny fraction of packages in
these repositories receive any meaningful attention and usage
from the community. Due to the size of these repositories,
however, this fraction still amounts to millions of downloads.
As an upper bound, we consider packages with more than
100,000 downloads per week to be unquestionably popular.
Packages above this upper bound make up the top 0.6% of
npm and the top 0.4% of PyPI. The analyses we describe in
this section aim at finding an appropriate threshold to separate
popular packages from unpopular packages between these
two bounds.
Effect of threshold on number of perpetrators: The first
analysis aims to determine how the number of typosquatting
targets influences the number of typosquatting perpetrators.
This is a transitive test, which means a package is considered
to be a typosquatting perpetrator if it, or any package in its
dependency tree, fits our definition of typosquatting. Doing
this emulates real-world conditions, as users typically would
not install a package without installing its dependencies. The
results of this analysis is depicted in Figure 5. Interestingly,
the curves corresponding to npm and PyPI are fundamen-
tally different. As the popularity threshold increases, the num-
ber of popular packages decreases. With this decrease in ty-
posquatting targets, one would initially expect the number of
typosquatting perpetrators to decrease. The trend for PyPI is
consistent with this behavior. The sharp drop in perpetrators
is due to a large number of packages that fit our definition of
typosquatting that also have just over 13,000 weekly down-
loads. As soon as the popularity threshold crosses 13,000,
these packages are considered to be popular and are therefore
exempt from being typosquatting perpetrators, causing the
drop in perpetrators.
In stark contrast contrast, npm’s trend steadily increases.
Figure 6: Relationship between popularity threshold and per-
cent of weekly downloads containing a typosquatting pack-
age.
The number of typosquatting perpetrators grows in spite of
the fact that the number of targets shrinks. This highlights
an interesting phenomenon present in npm: there’s a signifi-
cant amount of package name similarity between reasonably
popular packages. This idea is best exemplified by cases like
those shown in Table 2. All of these packages have signifi-
cant download counts. Examples like those found in Table 2
cause the unintuitive increase in perpetrators seen in Figure 5.
For small popularity thresholds, both packages in these pairs
are considered popular. However, as the threshold grows, it
passes the weekly download count of the less popular package,
which in turn turns the less popular package into a perpetrator.
Ultimately, this process increases the number of perpetrators
as the number of targets decreases.
Based on the analysis discussed above, we have chosen
to select a popularity threshold of 15,000 weekly downloads.
A popularity threshold of 15,000 weekly downloads is the
lowest threshold which keeps the number of typosquatting
packages reasonably low for both repositories. For both npm
and PyPI, approximately 3% of all packages on each reposi-
tory are potentially typosquatting for this threshold.
Effect of threshold on frequency of warnings: The second
analysis examines how frequently packages that could be con-
sidered typosquatting are downloaded. It is important to un-
derstand this datum in order to get a sense of how frequently
SpellBound will intervene during the package installation
process. Maintaining the frequency of interventions low is
important for two reasons. First, frequently interrupting a de-
veloper’s workflow with warning notifications risks incurring
in the well-known phenomenon of warning fatigue [19]. Sec-
ond, it is reasonable to expect that the number of packages
imported by mistake is a relatively small fraction of the over-
all number of packages imported by a developer. Therefore, a
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Package Name Weekly Downloads
object-assign 17,249,391
object.assign 10,843,774
isarray 30,271,796
is-array 69,131
is-buffer 19,143,770
isbuffer 35,684
memorystream 1,125,398
memory-stream 6,047
Table 2: Typosquatting cases with popular perpetrators.
very high number of warning is likely to consist overwhelm-
ing of false positives [17].
This analysis, like the first, is transitive in order to emulate
real-world conditions. Ideally, the number of alerts asking
the user if they are sure they would like to install the re-
quested package should be kept close to zero. The results
of this analysis are show in Figure 6. In this test, trends for
both repositories are noticeably similar than the trends in Fig-
ure 5. According to this figure, with any reasonable popularity
threshold, the percentage of weekly downloads which result
in a warning from SpellBound is around 0.1% for npm and
around 0.5% for PyPI. In other words, SpellBound generates
on average a warning every 200 to 1000 package installs,
which we consider an acceptable burden for a developer.
4.3 Signal Detection Rates
In this section, we consider the effectiveness of the typosquat-
ting signals used to determine package name similarity (ref.
Section 3). The signals we chose to include in this implemen-
tation of SpellBound detected approximately 60% of known
past attacks reported by the npm security team as typosquat-
ting. While this number may appear low, it chiefly stems from
qualitatively different definitions of typosquatting used by
npm and us.
For example, npm considers ruffer-xor, bwffer-xor, bufner-
xor, and similar ones to be typosquatters of buffer-xor. While
the former names are all at a Levenshtein distance of 1 from
the target package, it is unlikely that a developer would pur-
posely import any of the former packages in place of buffer-
xor. Typos are likewise unlikely due to the significant distance
between swapped character on most keyboard layouts. As elu-
cidated in Section 3, we found edit distance to be a poor
metric for typosquatting, and therefore we consciously avoid
flagging those cases, which would result in an unmanageable
number of warnings anyway.
Instead, to get a sense of how each of the signals were per-
forming, we considered the number of packages in each repos-
itory which match a given signal. These results are shown in
Table 3. Note that these figures contain no notion of dependen-
npm PyPI
Repeated Characters 443 40
Omitted Characters 3827 412
Swapped Characters 514 63
Swapped Words 1732 77
Common Typos 4409 533
Version Numbers 1148 116
Total 12073 1241
Table 3: Number of packages triggering each typosquatting
signal.
cies and, are therefore, not transitive. Here we are interested
in examining how aggressive each of the signals are. Interest-
ingly, despite npm having about 6 times as many packages as
PyPI, the number of npm packages which fit our definition
of typosquatting is almost 10 times higher. This result points
toward the conclusion that typosquatting is inherently a larger
issue in npm.
4.4 SpellBound Overhead
The goal of our final analysis of SpellBound is to determine
the temporal overhead it imposes on the package installation
process. To quantify the performance of SpellBound, 1,000
npm packages were selected at random, weighted by popu-
larity. Weighting the selections during this process is crucial,
as it creates a sample that simulates the downloading pat-
terns of actual repository users. Once selected, the contents of
these packages were locally cached to remove any uncontrol-
lable network-based effects on installation times. After being
cached, installation times for each package were measured
using npm’s official package manager and a version modified
to implement SpellBound. The official npm package man-
ager had an average installation time of 2.604 seconds, while
SpellBound resulted in an average installation time of 2.669
seconds, meaning SpellBound imposes an average temporal
overhead of about 2.5%. We believe this result is reason-
able and the slowdown incurred by SpellBound is effectively
unnoticeable.
Batch mode performance: Batch mode (ref. Section 3.2)
analyzes the entire package set in a single pass and is intended
to be used by repository maintainers to discover yet unknown
issues of typosquatting. In our experiments, we found that
SpellBound can analyze the entire npm package set in 11
minutes. This result suggests that SpellBound could be run
frequently (e.g., once per day) allowing quick identification
of unknown typosquatting cases.
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5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the broader implications of our
findings, include some of the subtleties related to typosquat-
ting, explore possible steps to mitigate typosquatting beyond
SpellBound, and consider alternative ways to implement Spell-
Bound.
5.1 Alternative SpellBound Deployments
As discussed in Section 3, our primary deployment of Spell-
Bound is a modification to existing package manager frontend
tools. Implementing our tool in this way allows typosquatting
protection to be non-invasive and fit into existing workflows.
Ultimately, we hope that our mechanism is incorporated into
existing package management tools. However, we also im-
plemented a standalone command-line tool that performs our
transitive typosquatting protection checks without the cooper-
ation of the frontend, thus allowing users to avail themselves
of typosquatting protection even if such protection is not di-
rectly integrated in the package manager.
The goal of SpellBound is to decrease the chances that
a user of a package manager will accidentally install an in-
correct package due to typosquatting. However, it is beyond
the scope of this work to model all of the ways in which a
user might confuse their target package name. For example,
confusion may stem from misremembering a name, or hear-
ing it incorrectly. Similarly, the particular keyboard layout
used by a developer influences the typos that that developer is
likely to make when typing in the package name. Collectively,
these differences may justify personalizing the typosquatting
detection scheme.
SpellBound relies on the concept of popularity. It is pos-
sible to define alternative notions of popularity by changing
the metric with which the popularity of a given package is
quantified (e.g. using the number of dependent packages).
Exploring these alternatives is future work. An additional
implementation detail of our detection algorithm is that it
considers potential victim packages and potential perpetra-
tor packages to be disjoint sets partitioned by the popularity
threshold. A natural extension would be to consider these sets
to overlap, such that somewhat popular packages could be
classified as typosquatting perpetrators or victims.
The evaluation results in Section 4 show that the perpe-
trator package detection algorithm developed as part of this
work is unobtrusive, but detects real cases of typosquatting.
Nevertheless, the modular design of SpellBound means that
the alternative approaches outlined above could be dropped
in to the tool with no changes to the workflow.
5.2 Server-Side Protection Mechanisms
Our technique successfully detected typosquatting that was ac-
tive in popular package repositories for over a year, leading to
effective remediation: developers updated their dependencies
to their intended target package, and repository maintainers
seized and deprecated the perpetrator package. Consequently,
we feel that our approach could aid server-side security teams
in scanning their entire repository to discovered latent ty-
posquatting instances. As discussed in Section 3, repository
maintainers can run SpellBound in batch mode to identify
suspicious packages that have already been uploaded. We
also consider some additional mechanisms that may help to
combat the typosquatting problems.
Preemptive takedown: An aggressive extension to server-
side batch mode operation of SpellBound is to invoke a typo-
quatting check at the time a new package is uploaded, effec-
tively disallowing the existence of too-similar package names.
This proactive approach is a natural extension to the case-
insensitive and delimiter-based naming restrictions currently
in place on npm and PyPI [4–6]. It further limits the potential
of a perpetrator package from gaining traction and achieving
legitimacy through the confusion of users. We note that an
implicit assumption of our current approach is that popular
packages cannot, by definition, perpetrate typosquatting at-
tacks. Our definition means that if an illegitimate package
gains enough traction to exceed the threshold, it can avoid trig-
gering a warning on installation. Disallowing the perpetrator
package from being uploaded obviates that issue.
Variant-insensitive package names: Much like disallowing
too-similar package names, a repository could map all vari-
ations of a package name to the canonical version of the
package. This approach means that the perpetrator would be
unable to upload their package, since the system would con-
sider the name to be taken by the target package. Furthermore,
it would address the typo by suggesting the correct target.
Some repositories already implement some limited form of
this behavior. PyPI maps all punctuation to hyphens and han-
dles all package installation requests in a case-insensitive
manner [4]. We believe such changes warrant future research.
A potential concern with allowing all variations of a name to
map to the same package is that it crowds the set of possible
names. We note that npm already incorporates a typo-safe
mechanism to allow similar package names, called scoped
packages [3]. The mechanism works by allowing package
names to begin with an @ symbol, followed by a namespace
portion (typically the package creator’s username), followed
by a forward slash, followed by the basename of the package.
Versions of many popular packages deployed using Type-
Script (a typed superset of JavaScript) are available under
the @types/ namespace (e.g. @types/node for the TypeScript
version of the node package). Scoped packages can be used to
alleviate the concern that a repository’s names may become
too crowded for a new package to be given a descriptive name.
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5.3 Defensive Typosquatting
One tactic currently used to prevent package typosquatting
is to preemptively register confusable variants alongside the
canonical package name, so that the variants cannot fall un-
der the control of a typosquatter. We refer to this tactic as
defensive typosquatting. In the absence of officially supported
mechanisms for defensive typosquatting, a benign placeholder
package will be registered under the variant name. We ob-
served instances of defensive typosquatting in both npm and
PyPI, where package creators (or 3rd party package develop-
ers) are free to create as many packages as they desire with
varying behaviors for placeholder packages. The placeholder
behaviors that we observed are as follows:
Transparent inclusion of target package functionality:
One approach is to transparently provide the functionality of
the target package to the user within the placeholder package.
This approach can be accomplishing with varying degrees
of sophistication. By leveraging the repository’s dependence
mechanism, a placeholder package creators can effectively
implement a passthrough to the intended target package. By
making the legitimate package a dependency of the place-
holder, the correct package is installed despite the request
being incorrect. When included in a project, the defensive
typosquatting package can simply import the legitimate pack-
age’s functionality. We observed this behavior in practice in
the npm package buynan, which (defensively) typosquats the
legitimate package bunyan. The buynan package simply im-
ports bunyan upon its inclusion. One limitation of this defense
is that it is indiscernible from a case of a malicious Trojan
package; at any point a 3rd-party owner of a placeholder could
change the redirect to a malicious payload. Furthermore, a less
sophisticated method for transparently including target pack-
age functionality is to clone the code of the target. However,
if the placeholder fails to stay up-to-date with the package
it defends, it can actually expose the user to latent vulnera-
bilities, effectively becoming a stale package typosquatting
perpetrator. This was the particular situation loadsh was in
when discovered.
User alerts: One possible option is to make the placeholder
issue an informative alert with directions to change to the
legitimate package. For example, the placeholder could print
a message during at install time or runtime to inform the users
of their mistake. This approach has been extensively used
within the PyPI repository [8, 18]. In this case, placeholder
packages utilize the install hook mechanism of PyPI to issue
a message at install time that directs users to the packages
they likely had in mind.
Package Deprecation: One mechanism used in practice to
alert users that they should change packages is the deprecation
mechanism. This mechanism allows a package maintainer to
indicate that it should no longer be used. When a deprecated
package is installed, the user is presented with an alert. Depre-
cation is used in practice when a stale package typosquatting
perpetrator is discovered, since it does not break dependant
code but still admonishes victims to update their dependen-
cies. One limitation of this technique is that deprecation is a
mechanism that is used for a variety of purposes. It is unclear
whether the deprecation mechanism is sufficient to alert users
of the type of error that they have incurred.
Defensive typosquatting will continue to have a place as a
stopgap mechanism to protect against package name confu-
sion, even in the presence of automated defenses like Spell-
Bound, since the confusion may occur due to the specific
context of the package name. Nevertheless, tools like Spell-
Bound can ease the burden of placing placeholder packages.
6 Related Work
Typosquatting and Defenses: Tschacher’s Bachelor the-
sis [38] demonstrates high success rates of a controlled ty-
posquatting attack, proving the importance of devising coun-
termeasures. It also briefly outlines defenses based on forbid-
ding names similar to those of popular packages, but does not
implement or evaluate them, and does not consider involving
developers in the decision process.
The creators of npm and PyPI have taken basic counter-
measures to combat typosquatting. Rules governing package
names for these platforms have become increasingly strict in
an attempt to mitigate the problem. Both platforms have incor-
porated restrictions on capitalization and punctuation-based
differences [4, 5]. User-led defense campaigns exist that aim
to "park" potential typosquatting names before they can be
used in a malicious manner [7, 8].
Domain Name Typosquatting: Domain name typosquatting
has long been a popular attack vector, allowing cybercrim-
inals to hijack web communications [35] and potentially
emails [36]. Such hijacking is typically operated by regis-
tering a domain name similar to a popular one. It is used
for financial gain, by serving ads, pushing drive-by down-
loads, or orchestrating phishing attacks. In particularly seri-
ous cases, regulations such as the US ACPA allow ICANN
to seize typosquatted domains to prevent confusion [1]. Such
legal framework does not exist for package typosquatting,
and indeed this approach may be difficult to apply due to the
fast-evolving nature of software ecosystems. Furthermore, not
all instances of package name typosquatting are the result of
explicit attacks.
Software Ecosystem Security: Most past efforts focused on
vulnerabilities of package managers themselves [16, 21], or
potential attack strategies enacted by malicious packages [31].
Both goals are orthogonal to ours, and none of these works
reviewed actual incidents or performed measurements on the
extent of the problem.
Other works more specifically analyze security risks aris-
ing from the presence of malicious packages in highly inter-
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connected software ecosystems [28, 44]. [44] also identifies
typosquatting as one of multiple possible avenues for attack,
but it provides no in-depth analysis of the phenomenon, nor
describes solutions.
General Characterization of Software Ecosystems: Liter-
ature presents many other analyses of software ecosystems.
While these works present useful information for understand-
ing these complex objects, they do not focus on typosquat-
ting or other potential security-related issues. Examples in-
clude [26, 33, 42].
Mobile Ecosystems: A related line of work is on the study
of mobile application markets such as the Google Play
store [22, 23, 39, 41]. These works are primarily concerned
with applications used by consumers, rather than applica-
tion components (packages) that are specific to the language
ecosystem and used by developers. As such, characterization
of app markets (and defenses proposed against malicious ap-
plications) are largely orthogonal to our work. The closest
work is in the detection of cloned applications, whereby a
lesser-known or actively malicious developer will re-package
and re-publish a better-known app. Detecting application
clones has typically been done via code similarity metrics [27]
or behavior [24]. In contrast, our approach is based entirely
on the package metadata and an analysis of the properties of
the package repository.
Supply Chain Vulnerabilities: Others have looked at the
related problem of supply chain vulnerabilities, i.e., vulnera-
bilities in the open-source applications on which a software
package depends [20, 30, 32, 37, 43]. These works typically
discuss identification or impact of potential upstream vulnera-
bilities. While an attacker could attempt to introduce such a
vulnerability via typosquatting, analyzing this possibility is
outside the scope of our work.
7 Conclusion
Package managers vastly improve the software development
workflow. They can quickly download and install third-party
packages, along with any dependencies, to import constructive
functionality into a project. Packages are typically requested
explicitly by name and currently, there exists no safety net for
developers during the package installation process. Typosquat-
ting attacks target those who make a spelling mistake and their
effects can be severe. These attacks are far from novel due to
their extensive history of targeting domain names. Although,
the focus of typosquatting attacks has recently grown to in-
clude package repositories. Despite hundreds of past attacks,
practical defenses against typosquatting in package reposito-
ries such as npm and PyPI have received little attention.
In this paper, we have shown that a defense against these
attacks is both practical and efficient. By comparing the name
in the requested package’s dependency tree to a list of proba-
ble targets, our proposed solution can protect developers from
typosquatting attacks. With an average overhead of 2.5%, a
warning-to-install ratio of 0.5%, and third-party confirmation
of flagged packages, our solution imposes a negligible burden
while protecting package creators and end users alike.
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